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Different Regions, Different Structures 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the French 
General Staff undertook the' preparation of a great map of the 
entire country at 1:80,000. The work proceeded under the 
direction of professional ing6nieurs-gzographes. But at the local 
scale young army officers attached to the General Staff did most 
of the legwork. In addition to preparing a detailed local map of 
the section assigned to him, the officer typically had to prepare 
a report describing the area, characterizing its people, and 
solving some sort of hypothetical military problem: how, for 
example, to hold off an invader coming from a given direction with 
a force of a certain size. That report took the name 
reconnaissance militaire. For his reconnaissance, each officer 
had to tramp his part of the country, compass and notebook in 
hand. 
Although many of the reports 'set down their facts with crisp 
precision, some authors adopted the model of the Statistique then 
in vogue among regional officials and,'local savants. They . 
presented ready-made histories of the 'localities, singl.ed out the 
military features of those histories, sketched the people's 
cultural peculiarities, inventoried economic activities, tabulated 
population figures, and described the important structures, if 
any. In addition to their contribution to the General Staff map 
of France, each of those officers helped record the life of one 
small corner of his country at one moment of the nineteenth 
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century. 
Let us reconnoiter five provinces -- Anjou, Burgundy, 
Flanders, Languedoc, and the Ile de France -- with those 
nineteenth-century officers. while they sketch out the map of 
France, let us reflect on how the varying involvements of the 
five provinces in statemaking and the development of capitalism 
reshaped the ways in which their people contended for rights, 
privileges, interests, and advantages. 
As the ing&nie~rs-~~ogra~hes parceled out the squares of the 
big map, most officers found themselves assigned to tracts of 
villages and fields. In 1846, however, second lieutenant Normand 
Dufie, of the 55th ~ i n e  Regiment, received quite a different 
assignment: His square included the city of Lille, with 75,000 
inhabitants, "a rich, hard-working, commercial population." "The . 
language of the common people is a corrupt French," reported 
Duf ie. "It .is the Flemish idiom. But in Lille everyone speaks 
French more or less well." In the countryside, he added, "the 
basic food is a very thick soup with butter or lard at noon and in 
the evening. During the summer they add a breakfast and a snack 
consisting of bread, butter, and cheese." 
Dufie described .the people of the region as "much given to 
drink; the cabaret is a consuming passion for them. To define 
~lemish character properly, we might say they are as faithful to 
the cabaret as to the Mass." Unfortunately, he commented, their 
favorite drink was gin, "a perfidious liquor almost- always mixed 
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with dangerous, corrosive ingredients" (AA [~rchives Historiques 
de l'~rmZe, Vincennes] MR 1169). 
His character sketch out of the way, Dufie went on to 
enumerate the "industrial arts" of Lille and its region: foundries 
for cannon and for bells, brass works, goldsmithing, manufacturing 
of starch, gin, all sorts of vegetable oils, leather goods, linen, 
cotton, and woolen cloth. "The city of Lille," he concluded, 
is the center of almost all manufacturing in its 
arrondissement and likewise of that of the whole department 
and many neighboring departments. The proximity . -of the 
frontier adds to commercial prosperity by making the city an 
entrepot for a great deal of trade (AA MR 1169). 
Although people worked truck gardens hard in the hinterland, it 
was clear that the Nord's agricultural activity served mainly to 
support the region's manufacturing and trade. 
Anjou lay far from Flanders. When Captain Testu described 
the region between Saumur and Cholet in 1839, he provided a very 
different picture. "In traveling through the southwest part," he 
wrote, 
one always comes to narrow, deep valleys containing brooks 
that become rivers in winter, local roads that are impassable 
eight months of the year, and that go around woods and around 
pastures surrounded by trees whose branches block the way, 
gates and stiles to open and close at every step, roads so 
sunken that you can only see the sky straight up, paths that 
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cross constantly and make it easy for the traveler to lose 
his way, unending solitude. 
That was the bocage', the hedgerow landscape of the region called 
the Mauges. Testu saw a large contrast between that forbidding 
countryside and the land nearer Saumur: 
The plain, richest part of the department, is composed almost 
entirely of the arrondissement of Saumur. Its fields are 
open, and its wheat harvest is very abundant. Most of the 
excellent wines, which are called cgteaux de Saumur, are 
white; but at Champigny-le-Sec, on the left bank of the 
Loire, they make a small amount of exquisite red wine; people, 
compare it to Bordeaux .wines, and that is ' a proper 
comparison. The growing of mulberry trees and the raising of 
silkworms in the region is an industry which deserves support 
(AA MR 1275). 
On went Testu' s comparison between the "backward" agriculture of 
the Mauges and the "advanced" agriculture of the Saumurois. The 
good captain's tours through the Mauges's underbrush had not 
revealed to him the existence in the bocage of widespread cottage 
, linen and cotton production or the importance of cattle-fattening 
for the Paris market. He had missed the modest cluster of cotton 
manufacturers in the city of Cholet. The textile workers and 
quarrymen of Angers, furthermore, fell outside his assigned zone. 
Nevertheless, Testu saw correctly that Anjou divided rather 
sharply into two different sorts of farming, and that in both 
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parts of the region agriculture was the dominant activity. 
Reconnaissances militaires from other regions place them 
between the extremes of industrial-commercial Flanders and heavily 
agricultural Anjou. In Burgundy, the military observers noted the 
scattering of forges in the east (especially in the hills 
approaching Franche-~omtg) and toward the north (especially in the 
A 
wooded region around Chatillon-sur-Seine), the openfield grain- 
farming and relative rural prosperity of north and northwest, the 
greater importance of enclosures and stockraising toward the south 
and east, the region of concentrated winegrowing below ~ijon, the 
pockets of iron mining, coal mining, and capital-concentrated 
manufacturing around ~hhatillon and in the area from Le Creusot 
southward. More than one officer joined captain Brossard, 
reporter on the area around Nuits in 1839, when he deplored the 
expanding production of cheaper, more profitable wines such as 
Gamay and ~oirieu, at the expense of the fine vintages that 
endeared Burgundy to connoisseurs (AA MR 1200). 
Military mapmakers in Languedoc had even greater variety to 
contend with than their colleagues in Burgundy. They saw the 
grain production of the Toulousan plain, the small-scale 
metalworking of the Pyrenees foothills, the expanding production 
of cheaper wines around Narbonne, the manufacture of woolens and 
silks from the Cevennes down to ~imes, the relatively concentrated 
textile production of a ~odgve or a Carcassonne, the smuggling -- 
a genuine industry for some wily souls -- of the mountains. As 
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colonel Bentabole reported of eastern Languedoc and adjacent areas 
in his 1842 synthesis of multiple reports, 
the inhabitants who aren't involved in smuggling come down 
from the mountains at harvest time and spread out in the 
plain. That season is for them rather a source of enjoyment 
than of fatigue. Accustomed as they are to the most 
difficult labors, those they do in the lowlands do not bother 
their health or their good humor. They often spend part of 
the dinner hour with. dances and songs that remind them of 
their mountains (AA MR 1303). 
More so than in Anjou, Flanders, or Burgundy, seasonal migration 
played a crucial part in the economy of Languedoc.. 
. . 
General Staff attaches who mapped the Ile de France, finally, 
found themselves in the most intensely commercialized region of 
all. Anywhere they went in the hinterland, they saw the vast 
influence of Paris: truck gardening close in, heavily capitalized 
grain farming farther out, manufacturing tied to that of the 
metropolis, in suc-h centers as Beauvais, trade and migration 
,oriented to Paris like water to a drain. Savor these notes from 
various reconnaissances: 
Road from Paris t o .  Aunay (1822): They take an enormous 
quantity of fertilizer from the capital'; farmers go there to 
get it, while bringing in vegetables and other agricultural 
products (AA MR 1287). 
Valley of the Bievre (1822): The proximity of Paris, where 
the inhabitants take all their crops for sale, means that 
contacts among the communes are unimportant (AA MR 1288) 
Road to Vincennes (1822): Connections with the surrounding 
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cantons, communes, and parishes are unimportant. Contacts 
with the capital are more active; the inhabitants go there to 
sell their products. They also have contact with Lagny, 
which has an important market . . . They have no retail trade 
of their own, and the four villages are entirely 
agricultural. Many Parisians have country houses here ( A A  MR 
1287) . 
Road to Meaux (1825) :. The frequency of the trips that they 
make to deliver lime or to take fruits and vegetables to 
market, and their continual contact with the inhabitants of 
Paris must cause some of their air of distrust, sometimes 
even of insolence ( A A  MR 1289) 
Road from Charenton to Paris (1827): There is continual 
contact among all these populations; they are involved in 
business and retail trade; their main orientation is toward 
the capital, whose markets they supply . (AA MR 1290). 
The Seine between Ecole ~ilitaire and ~rgenteuil (1833): The 
department of the Seine, the smallest of the kingdom, is 
nonetheless the richest and most important because of the 
capital which occupies its center . . . The banks of the 
Seine are jammed with a mass of villages and adorned with 
country houses whose richness and elegance announces the 
proximity of a great capital ( A A  MR 1291). 
Territory between Montmartre, Colombes, Courbevoie and St. 
Ouen (1833): Every village along the riverbank shows the 
influence of the capital's manufacturing industries ( A A  MR 
1292). 
Territory between Pantin, ' ~ r 6  Saint Gervais, ~omainville, 
Noisy le Sec, and Bobigny (1846): If proximity to the capital 
has removed some of the originality that set them off fifty 
years ago, it has also made them feel the benefits of our 
modern civilization. On visiting the area, one is surprised 
to hear language spoken that is so free of patois and local 
words ( A A  MR 1293) . 
~ilitary position between the forts of Vanves and ~icatre 
(1856): The proximity of Paris and of large factories has so 
degraded the people of the area that their very physiques 
show it ( A A  MR 1294). 
i In the central area, as this last note suggests, the heavier 
I forms of manufacturing were building up in the suburbs, as 
specialized trades, retail establishments, international c'ommerce, 
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finance, and governmental administration took over more of the 
central space. Although Paris, writ large, remained the country's 
largest single concentration of manufacturing, contrast was 
sharpening between the capital, with its diversified small-scale 
production, and coal-burning industrial monoliths such as Roubaix 
and Le Creusot. The identification of "industrialization" with 
"factory" (usine) was beginning to make sense. 
Concentration on a National Scale 
For most of eighteenth-century France, that equation was 
nonsensical., A few types of production characteristically took 
place in large establishments. That was especially true of 
products in -which the state had a monopoly or a strong direct 
interest, such as arms, salt, sailcloth, or tobacco. ~eligious 
orders responsible for orphans, paupers, or moral 0ffender.s 
sometimes produced textiles in organizations resembling factories 
in their discipline and spatial segregation, if not in their 
reliance on hand-powered machinery. Mines, with their high 
capital requirements, also typically involved good-sized firms and 
centralized work-discipline. 
The great bulk of France's manufacturing, however, went on in 
small shops and individual households. The great industrial 
regions, such as those around   yon and Rouen, contained webs 'of 
mercantile cities whose financiers and entrepreneurs guided the 
product ion of thousands of small-scale producers. Those producers 
had little discretion concerning what they would produce, or even 
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how much. Merchants often controlled them by debt, by legal 
pressure, and by ownership of housing, tools and raw materials. 
Nevertheless, the producers technically sold what they made to the 
merchants, instead of simply putting their time and effort at an 
employer's disposal for a wage. They were almost, but not quite, 
full-fledged proletarians. 
Merchants certainly imposed exacting standards on the goods 
they bought from workers; indeed, much of the day-to-day bickering 
between merchants and ostensibly independent artisans concerned 
such questions as whether the finished goods met the standards for 
full payment, whether the workers had taken some of .the raw 
materials the merchants 'had given them, and whose' measure should 
be used in gauging the quantity of goods produced. But merchants 
could not specify when, where, and how a weaver, spinner, or 
woodworker would do the work, or with what help from other members 
,of the household. 
What is more, rural industrial workers typically spent part 
of their time in agricultural labor. France's manufacturing labor 
force of the later eighteenth century consisted mainly of 
quasi-proletarians producing in their own households or in small 
shops. ~ h u s  a heavily industrialized region was not one with many 
factories, but one with a large quasi-proletarian manufacturing 
labor force. 
A clairvoyant observer of France in 1789 might have seen the 
structures of nineteenth-century industrial production forming. 
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Relatively large shops relying on water- or steam-power, similar 
to those that were proliferating in England, were beginning to 
take shape in Flanders, Normandy, and a few other regions. In 
1788, when France's Bureau du Commerce called on provincial 
intendants for reports on "factories and boilers" in their 
jurisdictions, M. Esmangard of Flanders and Artois reported no 
foundries or metalworking factories in his provinces. But as 
power-using producers he was gble to enumerate glassworks in Lille 
and Dunkerque , a pottery plant in ~ o u a i  , a porcelain manufactory 
in Lille, two shops making pipes in Arras, a gin distillery in 
Dunkerque, 21 salt refineries, 26 soapworks, 12 sugar refineries, 
plus 16 other potteries and tileworks. 
The clerk who summarized Esmangard's report for the Bureau 
remarked that : 
We see that the majority of these plants use coal, and that 
those using wood are too small to cause a shortage. In 
Maritime Flanders coal is cheap, because it comes from 
England. In the countryside they burn only peat, but a great 
deal of wood goes into heating in Lille, Arras, Douai, and 
St. Omer. The intendant indicates that wood is very 
expensive in those areas, but he does not indicate the price 
or the amount consumed. Hainaut's coal is too expensive for 
use in much of the Generality. The small amount that they 
get from Hainaut and Artois could not possibly meet the need. 
Companies have formed to search these provinces and find 
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coalbeds close to large cities or rivers (AN F~~ 680). 
Those searches succeeded; within forty years, steam-powered mills 
and coal-burning forges employed thousands of workers in Flanders 
and Artois. But in 1788 the shift to coal fires as the source of 
industrial power was just beginning-. 
At the other extreme, the report filed concerning the 
"factories and boilersll of Anjou by the intendant of Tours had 
practically nothing to discuss. . The section for the subdelegation 
of Montreuil-Bellay, for example, said flatly  here are no 
factories in th.is district." For the subdelegation of Saumur, the 
count included 20 lime kilns using charcoal, but nothing else (AN 
E'12 680). 
Yet other reports of the time made it clear that Angevins 
were producing and selling plenty of manufactured goods. As of 
1781, the royal inspector of manufacturing .in the little linen 
center of Cholet, south of the Loire, counted only 234 textile 
"merchants, clothiers, and workers" in the city itself. All of 
them were producing by hand, most of them in their own homes. 
Another 848 -- counting only the adult males, and not the hundreds 
of women and children in their households -- worked in the 
surrounding villages and sold their goods to Cholet's merchants 
(ADIL [Archives Departmentales, Indre-et-Loire, Tours] C 114) . 
Cholet's linens, especially its kerchiefs, served the 
national market, but also entered the slave trade via Nantes. As 
the inspector noted in his report, most of the actual producers 
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had no capital of their own, but worked for clothiers on small 
advances. Nevertheless, these household workers were collectively 
turning out around three million livres per year in finished 
goods, at a time when the national production of textiles was 
worth something like 1.1 billion livres (~arkovitch 1965, table 
6) 
Although dispersed textile production in Choletls hinterland 
hung on. for decades, and although Choletls merchants built small 
plants in the city during the nineteenth century, nothing like the 
urban implosion of Flanders occurred in the Choletais or elsewhere 
in Anjou. Indeed, Anjou as a whole deindustrialized during and 
after the Revolution. Its people devoted less and less of their 
energy to producing manufactured goods for sale, more and more of 
their effort to agriculture. 
In this sense, it happens, three of our five regions 
deindustrialized during the century after 1789. Not. only Anjou, 
but also Languedoc and Burgundy, moved more decisively into 
agriculture. For Anjou, the nineteenth century brought an 
expansion of winegrowing along the Loire, and of grain and cattle 
production in the rest of the region; the largest single exception 
to Anjouls deindustrialization was the expansion of the slate 
0 
quarries in ~rGlaze, southeast of Angers, close to ~onts-de-C& and 
the river. 
In Languedoc, similarly, the cottage textile industry of the 
uplands decayed. Although ~odGve had decades of nine- 
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teenth-century prosperity as a producer' of woolen cloth for 
military uniforms, the textile production of Bedarieux, 
Carcassonne and ~odkve as well hardly survived the nineteenth 
century; Mazamet only stayed in the wool business by taking up the 
shearing and processing of sheep hides (Johnson 1982) . Burgundy's 
wood-burning forges went out of business like their counterparts 
in Franche-~omt6, while winegrowing expanded in importance; only 
the region from Le Creusot south toward Lyon hosted concentrated 
manufacturing. In different ways, the Ile de France and Flanders 
industrialized as Anjou, Languedoc, and Burgundy lost their 
industry. 
Economic Pates 
The three de-industrializing regions all moved into 
winegrowing, but with varying vigor and' success. In Anjou, the 
winefields of the Loire Valley and the nearby Layon expanded 
modestly, but no new and important growing areas appeared. Nor 
did any remarkable concentration of landholding occur; ~njou's 
winegrowers remained a mixture of smallholders and day-laborers. 
In Burgundy, the old areas of fine wine production from pinot noir 
grapes -- the c&es -- retained their small scale of production, 
and continued to sustain communities dominated by smallholders. 
The cheaper wines of the gamay grape expanded in the areas 
adjacent to the cGtes, but primarily through the multiplication of 
smallholding rather than the development of large vineyards. 
Until the mid-century expansion of France's railroad network, 
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the winegrowing regions of Languedoc did not boom either. Indeed, 
the hilly areas of finer wines and peasant property kept much of 
their character into the twentieth century. However, the arc of 
plains near the Mediterranean from Perpignan around to Nimes went 
through an enormous transformation: rapid growth of capitalist 
winegrowing in the 1860s, crisis of the phylloxera blight in the 
1870s and 1880s, massive increase in the production of cheap wines 
on large properties thereafter. 
The early growth, the crisis, and the renewed expansion 
linked to each other: Phylloxera arrived on the blight-immune 
American vines with which capitalizing winegrowers of the 1870s 
had hoped to make more money, the blighting of ~rench vines 
encouraged the introduction of cheap, watered, and sugared wines 
from Spain and Italy while southerners were bringing new American 
vines to maturity, and the recovery permitted French winegrowers 
to enter the expanding market for mass-produced beverages. The 
shift to industrial techniques, large, vineyards,. and mass 
distribution proletarianized Languedoc's wine industry. 
Not all of rural Languedoc. turned to vineyard. The plains 
near Tpulouse, for example, continued to concentrate on wheat 
production, while the highland regions kept their mixed economies 
of grazing, small crafts, and seasonal migration. Likewise, .the 
bocages of Anjou maintained their system of grain and cattle 
production on medium-sized rented farms -- with the added fillip 
that a number of noble landlords began to take active interest in 
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the management of their estates and the politics of their tenants, 
and even started to live in their modest castles some of the year. 
In Burgundy, despite the decline of rural industry and the spread 
of gamay winegrowing, most regions held to peasant polyculture, 
with cash crops gaining ground after mid-century. The agriculture 
of the Nord became ever more subservierit to manufacturing. And 
the Ile de France continued its pattern of intensive market 
gardening close in, capitalist grain production further out. 
Even in the agricultural regions, capital and manufacturing 
concentrated increasingly in the cities. Angers, Dijon, and 
Toulouse all saw their trade ex.pand, their traders get rich, their 
banks grow, their small crafts give way to large plants. Angers, 
for example, specialized in industries based on agriculture: not 
only preparation and whdlesaling of food and drink, but also 
sailcloth manufacturing and the spinning of wool, cotton and hemp; 
only the -important slate quarries broke the city's ties to 
agriculture. Until mid-century, indeed, nearly a quarter of 
Angers' labor force worked directly in nurseries and market 
gardens within the city. Nevertheless, in 1856 a full 57 percent 
of Angers'. labor force gained their living from manufacturing 
(Lebrun 1975: 199). From that point on, the city grew mainly 
through expansion of its commercial services. Like Dijon and 
Toulouse, Angers specialized more and more in the coordination of 
trade and capital. 
Lille and paris became very different kinds of industrial 
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city. If we include Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing in the same 
urban cluster, that nineteenth-century metropolis epitomized 
France's new manufacturing centers: factories, dense and 
segregated working-class neighborhoods, rapid growth. Roubaix 
went from 9,000 people in 1806 to 121,000 in 1906, while Tourcoing 
grew from 12,000 to 82,000; the increase of Lille from 50,000 to 
215,000, (a mere quadrupling!) contributed to the rise of the 
three-city complex from 71,000 to 424,000 inhabitants. Within the 
set, especially after mid-century, a division of labor appeared: 
Roubaix and Tourcoing as factory towns dominated by family firms, 
Lille as financial, administrative, and cultural center tied more 
strongly to international capital. Together, they became France's 
greatest concentration of large-scale manufacturing. 
In the case of Paris, we must distinguish between the old 
center and the newer periphery. In the center, expanding trade, 
finance, services, and administration squeezed out both 
manufacturing establishments and working-class neighborhoods. 
Through the industrial shifts and the building of .new, elegant 
residential areas, the city's segregation by class became much 
more pronounced. Net departure of workers and workplaces was 
already occurring under the July Monarchy. After 1852, the great 
bustle of Haussmann and Napoleon I11 brought it to a climax. 
Small-scale manufacturing tended to move to the edges of the 
built-up area, while heavy industry located increasingly outside 
the toll gates, where cheap land, exemption from city taxes, and 
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easy access to canals and railways all made new sites attractive. 
Metalworking plants, for example, were already relocating in 
Clichy, Saint-Ouen, Saint-Denis, and elsewhere to the north and 
east of Paris before 1848. (Remember the prophetic reconnaissance 
militaire for the area near Saint-Ouen in 1833: "Every village 
along the riverbank shows the influence of the  capital.'^ 
manufacturing industries": AA MR 1292) . The northeastern suburbs 
became Paris' equivalent of Roubaix and Tourcoing -- with the 
important difference that instead of textiles many of the workers 
of Belleville and environs were making railroad cars, machines, 
chemicals, .and other products - requiring large applications of 
- -. 
capital and energy. 
As Figure ;_,'.I shows, all five urban clusters grew at similar 
rates during the nineteenth century's first half; paris led and 
Angers lagged, but ail the cities grew. During the great period 
of implosion after 1851, differences sharpened: Lille, Roubaix, 
and Tourcoing spurted ahead, Dijon and Paris acce-lerated, while 
the growth of Angers speeded up a bit, and that of Toulouse 
actually slowed down. After the turn of the century -- and 
especially with the first World War -- the growth of the cities 
fell almost to a standstill. In fact, the population of 
Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, a combat zone in World War I, fell 
slightly between 1901 and 1921. As average annual percentage 







All the regional capitals, that is, took part in France's urban 
implosion. But until the plateau of the early twentieth century, 
both centers of manufacturing and industrial capital grew faster 
than the rest. 
Rates of growth, however, equalize places of very unequal 
size. Paris began the nineteenth century with more than half a 
b 
million inhabitants, and left the century with 2.7 million. 
Throughout the century its population ran about five times that of 
its closest rival, Marseille, and at least six times that of 
Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing combined. The sheer difference in 
scale meant that Paris could be less intensely industrial than 
Lille-Roubaix-~ourcoing, and yet have the nation's largest mass of 
manufacturing. In manufacturing, in trade and, of course, in 
government Paris towered over the rest of France. And the 
movement of concentration continued through the nineteenth 
century. 
As a result of concentration, the great manufacturers and 
, '?. 
merchants of the industrial centers grew wealthy. Figure ,;-)2 
. if ,r 
provides a sense of nineteenth century changes in wealth in three 
REPERTOIRES 18 
of our cities: Paris, Lille, and Toulouse. The evidence comes 
from estimates of the values of estates. of persons dying in the 
three cities in different years scattered from - 1806 to 1911 
(source: Daumard 1973, multiple tables). The graph shows those 
values in terms of the quintals of wheat they would buy at the 
year's current prices -- a 'procedure that undervalues wealth in 
the high-priced years of 1846 and 1847, but otherwise gives an 
idea of purchasing power (Annuaire Statistique 1966: 406-407; 1 
quintal = 100 kilograms = 220.5 lbs . )  . 
Except for the poor disappearing day laborers of Toulouse, 
all categories experienced some increase in wealth over the 
century. The hierarchy of wealth, by this measure, corresponds 
ni.cely to the gradations of income, with the great merchants and 
manufacturers of Paris generally having about 5,000 times the 
wealth of the city's day-laborers. .Shopkeepers and retailers 
clustered together in wealth in the three cities; toward- .the end 
of the century, the wholesale merchants of slow-growing Toulouse 
seem to have joined them in comfortable mediocrity. Workers in 
the three cities likewise ended the century fairly close together. 
Yet the graph also reveals an important difference from city 
to city. The greater the industrial concentration, the poorer the 
workers and the richer the merchants. The difference in wealth 
I . between capitalists and workers therefore came out distinctly 
1 
I 
greater in Paris than in Lille, greater in Lille than in Toulouse. 




Just after the revolution of February 1848, Henri Lecouturier 
wrote a curious little book called Paris Incompatible with the 
Republic. Plan of a New Paris where Revolutions Will Be Impos- 
. sible. The book wrapped together the chief changes in the city -- 
growth, concentration, and segregation -- as causes of revolution. 
"While half of Paris dies of starvation,'! wrote ~ecouturier, "the 
other half eats for two. Centralization takes care of it; we are 
seeing the exhaustion of France, which produces, for Paris, which 
devours" (~ecouturier 1848: 15-16) . After enumerating the city's 
numerous forms of decadence and immorality, he went on to complain 
of an anonymity that gave free reign..to degenerates and criminals. 
"Paris will always be revolutioriary," declared Lecouturier, 
"so long as fragmentation isn't complete, SO LONG.AS THE NUMBER OF 
WHO HAVE TOO LITTLE" (Lecouturier 1848: 65-66). Yet he did not 
draw a socialist conclusion from that principle. Instead, his 
program for Paris included these elements: 
* banning of all industrial production except that which is 
absolutely indispensable; 
* expulsion of all businesses beyond those necessary to serve 
the residents; 
* a census of the population, followed by expulsion of 
everyone without a trade; 
* setting a limit on the labor force; 
* division of the entire city into four quarters separated by 
green space, with each quarter divided into four autonomous 
villages; 
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* construction of wide, straight streets like those of 
Washington; 
* new housing construction with easy purchase. 
Except for the wide, straight streets cut through' by Haussmann, 
Paris did not follow Lecouturierls advice. Nevertheless, 
Lecouturier's analysis reflects the widespread feeling in France's 
ru.ling classes that the combination of centralized power, 
concentrated production, rapid growth, and heightened inequality 
carried the threat of immorality, disorder, and rebellion. 
A Changing State 
Not long after Lecouturier set down his ideas about the 
consequences of Parisian concentration, Alexis de Tocqueville was 
writing his own analysis of the Revolution of 1848. Among the 
factors Tocqueville invoked were "the industrial revolution which 
in thirty years had made Paris the chief manufacturing city of 
France and had brought within its walls a whole new mass of 
workers to whom. work on fortifications had added another mass of 
unemployed agricultural worke'rs," and "the centralization which 
reduced the whole revolutionary action to seizing control of Paris 
and taking hold of the assembled machinery of government" 
(Tocqueville 1978: 113-114). Later on, Tocqueville generalized 
this analysis into an explanation of the eighteenth-century 
Revolution as well. 
Although Tocqueville underestimated the extent to* which the 
revolutionaries of 1789-1799 built a new system, he saw clearly 
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that the conjunction of a centralized state and a great metropolis 
made control of Paris crucial to national politics. After 
revolutionaries struggled their way to a centralized state 
structure, neither Napoleon's men nor the kings of the Restoration 
nor the makers of nineteenth-century revolutions undertook 
I 
seriously to dismantle the structure. 
The strengthening and centralization of the French state 
followed a remarkable sequence: establishment of revolutionary 
committees, militias, and provisional governments; dissolution of 
rival governmental structures; assumption of their fiscal powers 
and financial obligations; imposition of uniform principles and 
procedures for taxation, conscription, voting, add other forms of 
civic obligation from one end of the country to the other; 
creation of a hierarchical structure of assemblies and 
administrations operating continuously from nation to commune; 
control of the assemblies and administrations by means of roving 
representatives of the central power who relied on existing 
networks of bourgeois patriots for support; gradual but forceful 
substitution of the formal hierarchy for the -committees and 
militias; elaboration of a national surveillance system strongly 
resembling the one Paris' Old Regime police had used to control 
the metropolis; development of armed forces reliably subservient 
to the central government and to no one else. Organizers of the 
Revolution and the Empire built the most far-reaching centralized 
state the world had ever seen. 
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Chinese and Roman emperors had, to be sure, constructed 
vaster systems of government. But they and their counterparts in 
other empires had essentially ended their administration at the 
regional level, stationing their own bureaucrats and soldiers in 
provincial capitals and relying on coopted indigenous powerholders 
for routine government below that level. Old-regime France, on 
its much smaller scale, had not gone far beyond that arrangement. 
But the Revolution and the Empire, through intense struggle, 
established direct connections from national government to 
individual communes and almost -- via communal councils -- to 
local households and kin groups. Regional and local potentates 
who were hostile to the current national regime could still make 
life difficult for its representatives. Yet they had nothing like 
the bases of opposition afforded their old-regime predecessors by . 
parlements, estates, corporate trades and chartered muni- 
cipalities. 
The work of building the state did not end with the First 
Empire. Professional policing. provides one indication of the 
state's nineteenth-century expansion. If we exclude local forces 
such as game wardens, the  evolution and ' ~mpire consolidated 
official policing into two forces. The Gendarmerie Nationale, 
reporting to the minister of war and responsible for the 
patrolling of highways and rural areas, took over the functions of 
the ~ar&hauss&e, which had formed in 1720 under the same auspices 
and for essentially the same purposes. 
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The Surete Nationale extended to urban France in general the 
o.rganization of the pre-revolutionary ~arisian police force, 
putting the system's control into the hands of the Minister of the 
interior. The Surete not only patrolled streets and tracked down 
thieves, but also pumped, a regular stream of political 
intelligence from every department and major city to the capital. 
In the process, the Surete steadily absorbed existing muncipal 
police forces -- taking over, for example, the police of Lyon in 
1851, of Marseille in 1908, of Toulon in 1918, of Nice in 1920. 
The Gendarmerie and, especially, the' Surete continued to grow 
- 
through much of the nineteenth century. Figure 2 3  contains the 
fragmentary series concerning their forces and budgets now 
available (compiled from Nicolas 1883 and Annuaire de llEconomie 
Politique for individual years). The curves of growth have some 
interesting irregularities. The trend, of expenditure for 
Gendarmerie already ran upward in the 1840s. Louis Napoleon 
accelerated the .Gendarmerie's expansion during the first few years 
after his seizure of power, then let the force level 'off. After a 
declining investment in Gendarmerie during the last years of the 
Second Empire, the regime that came to power in the 1870 
revolution again pumped strength into the force. 
~luctuations in Surete Nationale police were ,much greater. 
'~fter each nineteenth-century revolution -- 1830, 1848, 1870 -- 
the new regime consolidated its control over the country by 
vigorously expanding the police force. The significant partial 
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exception to that rule is the Second Republic; it cut expenditures 
in half before Louis Napoleon, as President from the end of 1848, 
tightened his grip on state machinery. On the whole, policing and 
political repression waxed and waned together. The final ,effect 
was to lay down a uniform net of control over 'the entire country. 
Nevertheless, not all regions participated equally in the 
state's nineteenth-century expansion. For one thing, strength of 
support for successive regimes varied dramatically from one part 
of France to another. To take the obvious cases, under the July 
Monarchy Anjou and Languedoc harbored many powerful Legitimists, 
while Burgundy, the Ile de France and the Nord had few. Anjou's 
Legitimists consisted mainly of country-dwelling nobles and their 
supporters; they aligned themselves against city-dwelling 
Orleanists and Republicans. In Languedoc, cities such as Toulouse 
overflowed with powerful Legitimists; the Legitimism of Languedoc, 
furthermore, had a sharp edge of opposition to the protestant 
bourgeoisie. These variations affected both the ability of 
prefects to do the central government's bidding, and the 
likelihood that a region's notables would get their share of 
governmental largesse. 
For another thing, the gove'rnment's own investment in 
capital-intensive projects had distinct regional biases. This 
time the obvious example comes from the railroads. After an early 
period in which railway construction followed either the needs of 
mineowners or the whims of the royal court, the French undertook 
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the construction of a rail system consistin.g largely of links 
between Paris and major provincial cities. The pattern favored 
the Nord and, obviously, the Ile de France far more than Burgundy, 
Anjou, . or Languedoc. Burgundy gained some advantage over 
Languedoc and Anjou from its location on the path from Paris to 
I 
Lyon to Marseille. 
Paris had its first passenger line in 1837, and established 
direct connections to Rouen and Orleans in 1843. Lille linked 
directly to Paris via a main line -in 1846, ~ i j o n  in 1849, ~oulouse 
in 1856, Angers not until 1863. The extension of railroads 
represents a ,general pattern: Broadly speaking, a region's 
concentration of capital determined how soon and how much it 
received state-backed economic facilities, the favorability of its 
dominant classes to the current regime determined its receipt of 
amenities, and the strength of its opposition movements determined 
the extent of its repressive apparatus. 
In these regards, the Revolution had made a profound 
i 
difference. The shift to relatively direct rule diminished the 
I 
I impact of a region's economically dominant classes on its pattern 
of government. The consolidation and bureaucratization of the 
fiscal system further reduced region-to-region variability in the 
character and burden of taxation. The Catholic church emerged 
from the Revolution greatly diminished as an independent power. 
Although holders of land, both noble and bourgeois, continued to 
wield great influence in a property-qualified electorate, 
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merchants, financiers, and manufacturers grew increasingly 
powerful in the national arena. While leaving many features of 
local social life, production, distribution, and consumption 
little changed after the early flurries of experimentation with 
each of them, the Revolution transformed the national structure of 
rule. 
Five Kinds of  evolution 
Because old-regime social organization and articulation with . 
the central government varied significantly from region to region, 
the Revolution took significantly different forms in our five 
regions. In the Nord, we have already seen a strong, early 
I 
I movement of smallholders and rural proletarians against landlords 
in the Southeast (Hainaut and ~ambrgsis), and widespread struggles 
o£ rural proletarians against landlords and merchants in the 
I Northwest (Flanders, properly ' speaking) . In ~ainaut and 
Cambresis, the abolition of feudal dues and the sale of church 
I 
I 
. properties .helped establish a republic of smallholders. 
In Flanders, rich farmers and urban bourgeois dominated the 
sales. The rural population, on the whole, resisted the disso- 
lution of the church and stuck with its parish clergy. Once they 
saw the limits of a revolution preempted and controlled by the 
bourgeoisie, the Nord's rural people turned to defending whatever 
gains they had made. Thus the rural areas created a genuine but 
short-lived revolutionary movement. In the cities, the already 
powerful mercantile and manufacturing bourgeoisie did little more 
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than consolidate its power. During the first' phase of France's 
revolutionary wars, the frontier province again became the scene 
of encampments, invasions, and battles. During that first phase, 
the Nord had its only large taste of Terror. In general, we see a 
department settling with the Revolution early, and cramping into a 
defense of its interests thereafter. 
In Languedoc the Parlement, long a defender of provincial 
liberties against royal aggrandizement, quickly aligned itself, 
. . 
with the old regime when its own privileges were threatened. 
Rural proletarians made some efforts to redress the landlords1 
eighteenth century wrongs early in the Revolution. But later they 
lacked the capital to take advantage of the sale of church and 
emigre properties. 
.Languedocls Revolution took place mainly in the cities. In 
Toulouse, the absence of a grande bourgeoisie independent of the 
great landlords opened revolutionary power to merchants, profes- 
sionals, and master craftsmen. Toulouse became a national center. 
of Jacobinism. when the Convention smashed the Girondins in June 
1793, the patriots of Toulouse eventually supported the 
Convention. In 1793, both before and after the Federalist 
insurrection, cities of the zone from Toulouse to Montpellier 
formed major units of the volunteer Revolutionary Armies. Those 
armies actively fought the counter-revolutionaries of the South as 
they worked to assure the defense and feeding of their home 
bases. 
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~fmes, however, veered toward federalism. ~qrnes divided 
between a powerful minority of Protestant entrepreneurs and a 
determined majority of Catholic workers; 'most of the Revolution of 
~!tmes and its hinterland played itself out in conflicts between 
those two factions. At the purge of  irondi dins in Paris, N'fmes and. 
its region mounted an abortive rebellion. 
Languedoc's Protestants, urban and rural, supported the 
Revolution with vigor. Rapidly a significant counter- 
revolutionary movement, led by landlords and manned by Catholic 
peasants and rural proletarians, formed in the region. Grouped 
around the non-revolutionary clergy, they'opposed revolutionary 
conscription and taxation. In 1799, their rising dislodged 
revolutionary authorities in a number of Languedoc's cities, but 
failed to capture Toulouse, .and ultimately fell to republican 
military force. The White Terror of 1815 marked the moment of ' 
bitter Catholic and royalist revenge against the former Jacobins 
-- Protestant, Catholic, and indifferent -- of Toulouse, Nfies, 
and other centers. 
In Burgundy, the Revolution opened with significant attacks 
on landlords both within and outside the winegrowing regions, as 
well as vigo.rous struggles for power in such cities as Beaune. 
But once the struggles of the first few years had put in place a 
new structure of power, the Revolution passed with much less open 
division than marked Languedoc. In 1789 and 1790, supporters and 
clients of the old Estates constituted an important party. In 
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1790, they even managed to recapture the municipal government of 
Di jon from the militant lawyers and merchants' who had s-eized power 
in July 1789. Decimated by repression and emigration, however, 
that counter-revolutionary party soon disintegrated. Thenceforth, 
lawyers, merchants, and other bourgeois held the reins. 
Ir winegrowers of Dijon, Beaune, Macon, and 'the vineyards in 
between leaned toward the revolutionary left, or at least toward 
opposition to bourgeois power. So did the industrial workers 
A 
around Chatillon-sur-Sevre. Neither group, however, wielded much 
power. Beyond 'sporadic resistance to conscription and occasional 
demands for cheaper and more abundant foods, they mobilized rarely 
and ineffectively. The largely bourgeois committees, militias, 
and municipalities that formed throughout the region in July 1789 
remained in power, mutatis mutandis, thrbughout the Revolution. 
The Ile de France, to be sure, nurtured the national 
revolution. The experience of the Ile de France likewise nurtured 
some of the great myths of the French Revolution: that 
Enlightenment thought destroyed the monarchy, that the 
revolutionary movement sprang from a great subsistence crisis, 
that the threat of wanderers and brigands stimulated the creation 
of its political apparatus, that a bloodthirsty crowd smashed the 
old regime, that an assembly of sturdy provincials confronted a 
corrupt monarchy and insisted on reform. For each of these myths'. 
carries the trace of a genuine Parisian experience in 1789. 
In fact, the city's great concentration of journalists, 
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publicists, clerics, clerks, and literate artisans did create a 
clientele for the politicized clubs and salons that proliferated 
in 1788 and 1789. The defenders, first of the Parlements and then 
of the Third Estate, did indeed clothe their defenses in the 
language of ~nlightenment; natural rights and reason justified 
their opposition to arbitrary rule. Yet they were protecting 
genuine popular interests against real royal threats. 
The second myth likewise contains a half-truth. A widespread 
subsistence crisis, beginning in 1788, did spur an unusually broad 
range, of blockages and seizures of grain in paris and its 
hinterland. By the middle of 1789, as the Third p state of the 
Estates General was successfully declaring itself the ~ational 
Assembly, emergency committees and militias were indeed forming 
throughout the Ile de France, and preempting the power of the old 
municipalities. However, a significant part of the conflict over 
food in 1789 and thereafter resulted from the dispatch of official 
and semi-official raiding parties from Paris into the surrounding 
towns. Those parties were trying to assure the great capital's 
food supply in the face of increasing reluctance by producers to 
commit their grain to the market, and increasing unwillingness of 
villagers to let the grain leave for Paris. 
Unemployed rural workers did roam the region's roads in the 
spring of 1789. Many a sexton rang the tocsin to call for armed 
defense against the approach of brigands. But the marauders 
rarely came. And when they did, they usually turned out to be 
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hapless beggars or food-hunting delegations from paris. Aside 
from food blockages and scattered attacks on landlords' hunting 
apparatus, the rural sections of the Ile de France experienced 
relatively little open conflict in 1789. 
Orators, literati, clerks, and workers did gather regularly 
at the Palais Royal and elsewhere, calling for resistance to royal 
oppression, holding off or even recruiting the troops sent to 
disperse them. Ordinary Parisi,an people, furthermore, did 
repeatedly go to the streets, did increasingly proclaim popular 
sovereignty, and did occasionally take the law -- even capital 
punishment of traitors -- into their own ' hands. Marches of 
Parisian fishwives, militiamen, and officials, indeed, intimidated 
the king and eventually brought, the royal family to Paris. That 
much might suggest the unleashing o-f angry mobs. But think of the 
context: the continuous marching, meeting and organizing of the . .
capital, the conversion of electoral assemblies and provisional 
committees into instruments of municipal government, the tense but 
powerful- alliances developed between street people and assembly 
people. Those features of 'the early kevolution in 'the Ile de 
France -reveal an unprecedented popular mobilization. 
In point of fact, the Third Estate that met in Versailles 
included many provincials who found the palace' town shocking. But 
by the time of their definitively revolutionary actions they had 
long since fled Versailles for Paris. There, in tacit alliance 
with the city's artisans and shopkeepers, augmented by dissident 
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clergy and nobles, they braved the crown. Their actions become 
more comprehensible, furthermore, in the light of the royal effort 
to check them, to ring the capital with troops, and to dismiss the 
reforming Necker -- in short, to engineer a coup d'gtat. Thus 
each myth refracts a reality while making its true image 
unrecognizable. 
The myths also neglect other fundamental Parisian realities: 
the tension between the support and the .threat to revolutionary. 
leaders provided by the intense local organization of artisans and 
shopkeepers into their own assemblies, societies, and committees, 
the vulnerability of a national assembly located in the capital to 
organized invasions by determined activists, the incessant flow of 
people and information to and from the country's other cities, the 
eventual extension to the entire country of the system of 
surveillance and' political. control pioneered in the capital, 
indeed modeled to some degree on. the royal policing apparatus of 
the old regime.. In all these regards,, Paris and the .-Ile de France 
occupied a unique position in the Revolution's unfolding. 
Anjouls '~evoiution and Counter-Revolution 
. . Anjou, too, could claim uniqueness. It shared with Languedoc 
the distinction of raising a serious counter-revolutionary 
movement, one that outlasted the  evolution itself. Although its 
counter-revolutionaries mobilized later than those of Languedoc, 
,however, they soon posed a far more serious threat to the 
Revolution's survival. 
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In 1789 and 1790 ~ n j o u  did not look much different from 
Burgundy or Languedoc: Struggles over food supply taxed autho- 
rities throughout the region. Larger cities formed their 
committees, clubs, and revolutionary administrations in the face 
of those struggles, and in the presence of new allies in big 
cities elsewhere, including paris. Merchants and lawyers -- 
essentially the same group who had gotten into politics in the new 
provincial assembly of 1787 and 1788 and had organized the 
province's preparations for the Estates General of 1789 -- 
established a new governing coalition. Nobles sulked, then 
started to emigrate in considerable numbe,rs. 
The more or less simultaneous dispossession of the church, 
imposition of an ecclesiastical civil service, sale of church 
properties, and penetration of revolutionary government to the 
village level sharpened the division in Anjou.. On one side stood 
city-based bourgeois revolutionaries and their village allies. On 
the other, a coalition of substantial peasants, rural artisans, 
and parish clergy. That polarization, in turn, forced most rural 
people to take sides. 
In a local parallel to the struggle of Paris with its 
hinterland, the National Guards of the .region's small cities 
sought to subjugate the fractious back country. They marched 
around trying to enforce compliance with revolutionary edicts, 
protect the constitutional clergy, shore up their few rural 
allies, and assure their own food supply. That military 
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proselytization only accentuated the division. In the Mauges, the 
bocage of southern Anjou, the bulk of the population lined up 
against the revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
Similar processes aligned much of the rural population 
against the  evolution in almost all the bocages of western France 
-- not only those of Anjou, but also those of Poitou, Brittany, 
and Maine. "The terrain of rebellion," comments Paul Bois, "was 
the bocage, with its dispersed settlement; rebellion always 
stopped at the edge of open-field landscape" ( ~ o i s  1981: 124). 
But those bocages varied in the extent of their polarization, the 
intensity of their conflict, and their vulnerability to military 
and political control from the region's cities. 
North of the Loire, in general, armed resistance to 
revolutionary authority took the form of Chouannerie. Chouannerie 
involved little open warfare, but plenty of ambush, harassment, 
individual assaults, and attacks on property -- of guerrilla or 
terrorism, depending on your sympathies for or against the rebels. 
South of the Loire, things developed differently. The people 
of the Mauges and adjacent bocages of Poitou raised more.sustained 
and effective resistance to the efforts of revolutionaries to 
impose control. Several features of local social organization 
combined to produce that difference: the presence in villages of 
bourgeois who were organizing cottage textile production and 
administering the estates of absentee nobles; the importance of 
substantial peasants who were typically tenants of nobles or 
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ecclesiastical landlords but had to deal directly with their 
bourgeois agents; long struggles for local preeminence between the 
parish clergy and the resident bourgeoisie; the weakness of 
national military forces and revolutionary militias in the region. 
In 1791 and 1792, clandestine masses and nocturnal processions 
became the rallying points of counter-revolutionaries; they 
accelerated along with attacks on.constitutiona1 clergy, refusal 
to pay taxes and accept revolutionary administrative measures, 
boycotting of elections, assemblies, and offices, threats of 
violence to rural patriots. 
The Mauges behaved in stunning contrast to the region around 
Saumur. In the Saumurois, rural winegrowers and small farmers 
quickly cooperated with the revolutionary bourgeoisie, accepting 
ecclesiastical reform, inducing their clergy to accept it as well, 
buying church properties, attending revolutionary ceremonies, 
serving in the National Guard, enlisting in the national armies, 
even joining in the forces sent to put down rebellion in the 
neighboring Mauges. 
After a number of attacks on patriots in 1791 and 1792, the 
great insurrection of 1793 began in March, with widespread 
resistance to the national call for mass conscription, followed by 
attacks on local patriots and nearby cities. Community bands of 
improvis.ed soldiers soon consolidated into makeshift armies 
commanded chiefly by local nobles with military experience. With 
the armies marched priests who had rejected the revolutionary 
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reorganization of the church, then hidden out in the countryside 
in defiance of the beleaguered revolutionary authorities. 
These ragged forces seized control of most of the Mauges and 
of adjacent sections of Poitou, made temporary conquests of 
Saumur, Angers, Cholet, and other patriotic cities, and held off 
major revoluti0,nary armies for about six months. ~ebellions of 
various sorts recurred in the region in 1794, 1795, 1796, 1799, 
1815, and 1832; the rest of the period from 1793 to 1799,' 
furthermore, was full of raids and confrontations. AS in 
Languedoc, the resistance. movement that formed during the , 
Revolution's early years changed character considerably as years 
passed, but took decades to disappear. 
Some of the difference between the r.evo1utionary and 
counter-revolutionary regions of Anjou resulted quite directly 
from variations in the correspondence between local material 
interests and revolutionary programs. Monastic orders and 
external titheholders, for example, held much more .of the 
ecclesiastical wealth of the Saumurois than was the case in the 
Mauges. In the Mauges, parish clergy held most of the church 
property. It was easier and more profitable to be anticlerical in 
the Saumurois . 
Again, peasant property was relatively widespread in the 
Saumurois, while most of the Mauges' householders were tenants. 
The only peasants of the Mauges with capital, furthermore, were 
the larger tenant farmers; most often they leased their 20-hectare 
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farms from rentier noble landloirds via the landlords' bourgeois 
agents, and brought their capital in the form of cattle and tools. 
They had little prospect of outbidding the bourgeoisie in any 
auction of church or emigre property. 
A revolution promoting the rights of property, restricting 
the power of the church, forwarding trade, and establishing 
relative political equality among propertyholders had a ready 
public in the merchants and smallholders .of the Saumurois and 
Loire valley. In the Mauges, .the tenant farmers, agricultural 
laborers, and textile workers who formed the great majority of 
the population had much less to gain from such a program. 
The Mauges' people also had something to lose from the 
disestablishment of the church, whose parish revenues provided a 
small cushion against unemployment, and whose parish clergy served 
as a counterweight to .the local bourgeoisie. To put welfare and 
political power into the hands of the very merchants and lawyers 
who had already demonstrated their interest in cutting wages, 
increasing the return from leases on the land they owned or 
administered, and acquiring more land for their own use -- that 
.. prospect threatened the well-being of most of the rural 
population. 
Yet such a configuration did not guarantee that the peasants 
and artisans of the bocage would end. up counter-revolutionary. 
That depended as well on the alliances and enmities they formed. 
Aligning themselves against the bourgeoisie threw the rural people 
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of the Mauges into the arms of the clergy and the nobility. In 
other parts of the West, peasant communities that had maintained a 
certain independence vis 2 vis the local bourgeoisie made their 
peace with the Revolution (cf. Le Goff & Sutherland 1974). 
Elsewhere in France, class coalitions likewise made a large 
difference in alignment for or against the Revolution. Peasants 
and agricultural laborers of Flanders, who had long fought to hold 
back the assaults of capitalizing landlords, nevertheless bought 
into the first round of revolutionary reforms. Among Languedoc's 
Protestants, merchants, artisans, and peasants alike opted for the 
Revolution, their alliance against Catholics overriding the 
divergence of their other interests. 
On the whole, the less wealthy peasants and' agricultural 
workers throughout France had 1ong.been struggling to hold off the 
advance of agricultural capitalism. The general fit between their 
interests and revolutionary programs concerning the land strongly 
affected their orientation to the Revolution as a whole. But 
within those limits, whether they lined up with or against 
revolutionaries whose actions would ultimately advance 
agricultural capitalism also depended on the local play of 
alliances with or against the bourgeoisie. 
Anjou's Post-Revolutionary Contention 
The century following Napoleon's defeat of 1815 created the 
France we know today. That truism is even truer for popular 
contention than for governmental structure or for character of the 
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dominant classes. 
Anjou., it is true, might seem to be a contrary case; there, 
after all, ostensibly counter-revolutionary movements stirred up 
the countryside from the early Revolution to the , 1 8 4 0 ~ ~  and the 
department of Maine-et-Loire entered twentieth century electoral 
politics as a right-wing bastion. In May 1815 the marquis 
dtAutichamp had sounded the tocsin in southern Anjou. Like his 
allies in neighboring ~eux-~&vres and vendze, he raised a force of 
a few thousand men to march against patriotic cities and 
Napoleonic troops. The insurgents even managed to control the 
bocage for a month, and to divert 20,000 imperial soldiers from 
the forces fighting around Waterloo. 
After Napoleon's second abdication in July 1815, royalist 
forces occupied Durtal and disarmed the patriot centers south of 
the Loire. In 1832, when the duchesse de Berry debarked in 
Provence and made her way to the vend6e to call' for a Legitimist 
rebellion against the new July Monarchy, a few half-hearted bands 
again mustered to attack government forces' before succumbing 
again. Small bands of Chouans continued to attack government 
personnel and facilities from time to time over the next two 
years. 
All this counter-revolutionary activity looks like a 
carryover from the eighteenth century. Indeed, its noble leaders 
portrayed it as a straightforward continuation of 1793's struggle. 
But in fact Anjou's nineteenth-century politics were falling into 
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place. Instead of widespread popular insurrection of 1793, the 
events of 1815 and 1832 depended largely on important regional 
nobles' calling up of their personal clienteles in the name of the 
Bourbons. Returning to their estates, great Angevin landlords 
devoted themselves to managing their properties, building their 
regional political bas,es, and constructing the myth of a faithful 
royalist peasantry. 
In the cities, especially Angers, life followed a very 
different beat. In February 1826, for example, Mardi Gras brought 
a guarded critique of Anjou's nobility from the liberals of 
Cholet. According to the subprefect, in the Mardi Gras tableau: 
A feudal lord, called Prince of Darkness, appeared with many 
followers. They all wore hats in the shape- of candle- 
snuffers. They carried two signs. On one was painted a 
donkey carrying a torch covered by a snuffer, with bats at 
the four corners. On the other you could read LONG LIVE THE 
GOOD OLD DAYS! Others carried night birds and a gibbet. 
Last came a bust of Voltaire. 
The maskers put on two scenes: the lord's marriage, complete with 
enumeration of his feudal rights; the trial and' hanging of a 
vassal for killing a rabbit (ADML [Archives ~g~artementiles de 
~aine-et-Loire, Angers1 21 M 162) . Local royalists, according to 
the subprefect, were not amused. 
For several decades, the contestation of Anjou's liberal and 
republican activists took mainly symbolic forms: masquerades, 
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scattered shouts of slogans, banquets. The government made more 
extensive action difficult. In June 1830, for instance, when 
Angers' liberals planned a gathering to welcome two deputies who 
had spoken out against the king's recent abridgements of civil 
rights, the prefect forbade the gathering. When a crowd led the 
deputies into town anyway, gendarmes surrounded the house ' where 
deputies were scheduled to meet with their supporters, and 
scattered the crowd. That ended the mild display of opposition 
(Le Moniteur , 15 June 1830) . 
So it went through the 1830s. The regional prosecutor's 
report on the "moral and political situation" in April 1834, to 
take a convenient indicator, dwelt on the difficulties of cleaning 
up the last Chouans. It devoted but a sentence to Angers' Societe 
des-Droits de l'Homme, who were "trying to indoctrinate workers on 
their doorsteps and in the wineshops" but had "failed in the face 
of the people's calm mood1' (AN BB3 167). Angers' republicans, 
drawn essentially from students and the local bourgeoisie, 
faltered through the 1830s. Nevertheless, they started their own 
newspaper -- le ~rgcurseur de llOuest -- in 1840. During the 
1840s, they began agitating for press freedom and expansion. of 
suffrage. 
What Angevin republicans did not do' was .to form alliances 
with organized workers or draw workers, organized or not, into 
their own ranks. That was not because all workers were inactive. 
During the 1830s and 1840s, strikes became more frequent in 
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Anjou's cities. They continued to take the form of the turnout: 
The initiators tried to bring out the workers in all the' local 
shops one by one, to hold a general assembly of the trade in a 
protected location, and then to bargain with the city's masters 
collectively. Turnouts also continued to call down repression: 
~ a j o r  strikes of ~ngers' locksmiths (1834) , tailors (1836), 
cabinetmakers (1841) and, especially, construction .workers (1845) 
all brought arrests and convictions. 
Elsewhere, likewise, authorities used the language of 
repression to describe and deal with workers' collective action. 
The prosecutor of Poitiers, for example, described a turnout of 
Cholet's weavers on 8 and 9 October 1840 as "troubles". The 
city's workers had assembled to demand an increase in the price of 
the goods they finished. Two hundred weavers from nearby 
Mortagne-sur-Sevre joined them in the streets. When the clothiers 
had agreed to a new scale of payments, the troubles "calmed down" 
and, in the prosecutor's words, 
the workers, back at home, went - back to their tasks and 
rejoiced in concessions that seemed likely to end their 
misery, which is unfortunately all too real. 
But the calm'didn't last long. The clothiers having refused 
to abide by the scale they had previously accepted, the riot 
began again on the 12th. That day the workers of Mortagne 
did nothing, and the Justice of the Peace used his influence 
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to make the workers do their duty. 
My deputy continues to assure me that up to now politics has 
nothing to do with'Choletls seditious movement. He adds that 
in the midst of the mob, the men in it declared their sincere 
attachment to the July dynasty and to our constitutional 
institutions. It is very likely that the workers mean it, 
and have no other fault but to be acting illegally. Still 
one can't help recognizing that behind them are Legitimists 
who are watching how things go, and would not miss the chance 
to profit by the discontent and irritation of the inferior 
classes (AN B B ~ ~  1386). 
. / 
The keywords clang: troubles, emeute, attroupement, mouvement 
s6ditieux, classes infgrieures. The search for a "political" 
connection -- one tying the strikers to organized opponents of the 
regime -- informs the authorities' surveillance of workers. But 
, in the absence of that political connection, and in the presence 
of reneging on an agreement by the local capitalists, the 
prosecutor is inclined to stay his hand. Thus the system leaves a 
little room for workers' collective action. 
Except for slate quarrymen, however, Anjou's workers took 
little advantage of the 1848 Revolution to organize or to connect 
their existing organizations to national politics. ~uarrymen' then 
launched a general union (a syndicat). The general union, in its 
turn, may well have formed the matrix in which the Marianne, a 
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secret society with socialist leanings, took shape after 1851. 
The quarrymen's strike of 1852, 500 workers strong, seemed to 
reflect more extensive organization than its predecessors, and 
very likely involved the ~arianne. That secret society went so 
far as to organize, in 1855,' an abortive armed insurrection in 
~r6laz6, ~aint-~arth6lem~, ~onts-de- and Angers. 
Anjou's most common varieties of open struggle in the 1830s 
and 1840s, however, were not strikes or insurrections. They were 
old-fashioned efforts at diverting to local consumption food 
supplies that were destined for other markets. ~njou's widespread 
blockages of grain shipments in 1839 and 1840 occurred not in the 
cities but mainly in bocage villages such as Le May-sur-Evre, St. 
Pierre Montlimart, Jallais, and Coron. In those villages, a 
significant part of the population worked in cottage textile 
production. 
Blockages of grain continued to occur in those places during 
crisis years for another decade or so. 1846 and 1847 brought 
Anjou's last significant cluster of blockages, although here and 
there in Anjou people blocked shipments well into the 1850s. That . 
was the end. Hunger and poverty continued, but people acted on 
them in other ways. In about 150 years, the various forms of open 
struggle for control of locally-available food had run their 
course. 
From the 1850s onward, Anjou' s public contention pivoted 
mainly on strikes, demonstrations and public meetings. Although 
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strikes remained illegal until 1864 and trade unions were banned 
until 1868, workers, employers, and political authorities began 
pacing out new . limits for legitimate strikes and workers' 
organizations. 
Not that authorities abandoned their conception of strikes as 
disorders to be repressed. When some of ~ngers' carpenters struck 
in May 1860, the deputy prosecutor for Angers immediately charged 
them with the offense of coalition. The strike revived anyway in 
July. Then the prosecutor began preventive detention - .of its 
likely leaders.. Yet he saw the logic' of their action: 
We have a good deal of construction work in Angers. w e  might 
reasonably fear that as. in 1854 the various building trades 
would follow the carpenters' lead, and that the strike would 
spread to all our construction sites. That is what persuaded 
me to ask the deputy prosecutor to put a case in the hands of 
the investigative judge (juge d' instruction) of this court, 
in order to give a healthy warning to workers who are 
susceptible to being drawn in (AN B818 1609, letter of 15 May 
1860). 
Five days later the same prosecutor recognized that in the upswing 
of the time, "workers found that it was a good time to ask for 
something, and they asked for it' (AN B B I ~  1609). 
Other strikes that year involved carpenters of La ~l;che, 
slate quarriers of ~rglaz6, stonecutters of Angers, bleachers of 
Cholet, and construction tradesmen of Beaufort. Remembering the 
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provoked three days of large anti-Semitic demonstrations, 
involving priests and students of the Catholic University, in 
Angers. But the disestablishment of the church divided Anjou more 
than the Dreyfus Case. During the first half-dozen years after 
the new century began, the church's defenders resisted the closing 
of monasteries, the secularization of schools, and the inventory 
of church property. Their .action included one of the few 
occasions on which the most visible "rioters" in a. violent 
demonstration were nobles. This was the news from Angers in 
August 1902: 
Following a lecture on freedom of education at the Circus 
chaired by .the comte de ~aille/, senator, and organized by a 
majority of the departmental council to protest the dismissal 
of the sisters, a demonstration took place.   bout two 
thousand participants in the meeting went through the streets 
leading to the prefecture, where they had no authorization 
. . 
to go. Extensive security measures had been taken, and ' 
Gendarmerie brigades came to reinforce the gendarmes of 
Angers. 
During the demonstration a number of arrests occurred, 
notably those of the marquis Henri d1~rrnaille/, mayor of le 
~ourg-dllre', for r.efusa1 to move on; of baron Pierre de 
~ a n d 6 ,  mayor of ~o~ant-la-~ravo~sre, for the same reason; of 
baron Louis de ~andg, brother of the preceding person, for 
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Marianne insurrection five years earlier, the prosecutor looked 
searchingly at ~rglazg's strikes for signs of secret society 
activity. He found none except the presence of a few former 
members of the Marianne. 
From the 1860s to .World War I, strikes provided the main 
occasions on which Angevins contended publicly on a large scale. 
Textile workers, men in the building trades and, as always, 
quarrymen led the way. Shoemakers, foundry workers, and 
railwaymen joined them from - time to time. Even in ~njou, a 
latecomer to industrial concentration, the locus of strikes 
shifted away from whole communities toward larger firms and parts 
of cities. 
The big strikes of 1887 and 1888 in Cholet and its region 
marked the last concerted effort of textile workers in small shops 
and domestic production to hold off the evils of concentration. 
Although the slateworkers of ~rglazg and vicinity kept semi-rural 
sites from disappearing entirely, the characteristic .Angevin 
strike increasingly resembled the conflict of 1903 in which 1,500 
workers of the Bessonneau textile plant walked off the job. Small 
potatoes by the standards of ~oubaix or Paris, such a strike 
nevertheless aligned Angers with industrial centers elsewhere in 
France. 
As the firm-by-firm strike came into its own, so did the 
meeting and the demonstration. In Anjou, as compared with other 
regions, religious issues bulked large. In 1895, the Dreyfus Case 
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assault on an officer; and M. Henri d1~ubign6, property owner 
in ~ourg-d'  re), seditious shouts; of Maximilien Nicolle and 
Henri Normand, insulting an officer (Le Constitutionnel, 25 
August 1902). 
Despite elite leadership and reactionary program, then, the 
opponents of secularization borrowed the prevailing forms of 
contention: the public meeting and the demonstration. Anjou, like 
the rest of France, had adopted the new repertoire. 
other Voices 
As represented by Flanders, Burgundy, Languedoc, and the Ile 
de France, the rest of France underwent much of the same evolution 
as Anjou. But on the whole it did so earlier, with more direct 
participation in national revolutions and in collective demands 
for democratization, for workers' rights, for protection against 
arbitrary rule. We can see the difference by means of' quick 
comparisons of the five regions at the time ,of five political 
crises: those of 1830, 1848, 1851, 18-70-71, and 1905-07. 
In 1830, when Anjou's Legitimists were girding to turn back 
the work of the July Revolution, their cousins in Languedoc were 
likewise activating. But in Languedoc, a significant ~epublican 
movement was forming as well; around Toulouse, indeed, Legitimists 
and Republicans joined in a tacit alliance against the July 
Monarchy. Besides turnouts and opposition to tax-collectors, 
Languedoc's open contention of 1830 consisted largely of the 
display and destruction of political symbols such as the fleur de 
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lis and tricolor; battles raged around the two flags in Toulouse 
on 4 August. Although Burgundy's winegrowers joined 
enthusiastically in the opposition to sales taxes, the year's big 
event was the insurrection of 28 July; at that moment, the people 
of Dijon not only hooted the Princess Royal, but stoned the royal 
troops sent to maintain order. People in Lille also stoned those 
troops that remained faithful to. outgoing King Charles X, but not 
until 30 July. In the Nord, the rest of the' year brought more 
turnouts and food riots than occurred in Anjou, Languedoc, or 
Burgundy. 
In the Ile de France, finally, arrived the critical events of 
the revolution -- the gatherings to protest Charles X's 
dissolution of. the National ~ s s e m b l ~  and institution of strict 
press controls, the building of barricades, the popular occupation 
of the Hotel de Ville, the street fighting with troops, and so on 
to the king's abdication. Furthermore, after the installation of 
the new regime its authorities had to contend continually with 
workers who demanded their share of the rewards. Perhaps the 
year's peak of post-revolutionary conflict came on 12 October, 
when people recognized the old regime's ex-convict police chief 
~idocq (Balzac's Vautrin) on the street, and besieged the building 
in which he took shelter. 
In 1848, Anjou again remained peripheral to the revolution, 
facing the year with a few invasions of forests, workers' brawls, 
and other minor conflicts. Languedoc, in contrast, sprang into 
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action with its own Republican banquet campaign, active support of 
the Revolution in the cities coupled with considerable opposition 
in the countryside, multiple invasions of forests, strikes, acts 
of resistance against tax collectors and, in Toulouse, struggles 
between moderate and radical Republicans . For Burgundy, 1848 
brought a broad mobilization of workers and winegrowers in the 
region's cities, plus extensive efforts of peasants to even 
accounts with their landlords. In the Nord, Republicans organized 
demonstrations of their opposition to ~ o u i s  philippe almost as 
soon as their Parisian confreres, and rapidly joined in their own 
variant of the February Revolution. Throughout the region, 
opposition between workers and owners animated the politics of 
1848. Seizures and blockages of grain occurred widely, struggles 
between Belgian and French workers reappeared, and strikes -- 
sometimes insurrectionary and sometimes quite general -- 
multiplied. Again the Ile de France, and especially Paris, 
dominated the national revolutionary movement; the region's action 
li; 
went from early attacks on railroad property to Parisian 
streetfighting in February and June to frequent workers' strikes 
and demonstrations. 
I 
1851 presented a different pattern. On the whole, Louis ~ 
Napoleon's active searching out of enemies from 1849 onward 
demobilized radical republicans in every region. The year's 
action, however, clustered around the last step of that 
repression, his coup d'etat of 2 December. 'In ~njou, even the 
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coup brought no more than an unarmed demonstration in Angers. 
Languedoc divided more sharply and actively be£ ore the coup, with 
small-town republicans actively asserting themselves. At the 
coup, towns and villages sent thousands of men to defend the 
Republic. Languedoc's departements of ~rdgche (with an estimated 
3,500 participants in armed rebellion) , Gard (4,000)-, and ~e/rault 
(8,000) raised three of the largest rebel. forces (Margadant 1979: 
ll).. In the ~Qrault, ~Qziers stood at the center of a 'large 
network of small-town insurrections. Indeed, Bgziers was the 
largest city in France actually taken .over by the ~e~ubli'can 
insurgents of December, 1851. 
By comparison, resistance in Burgundy remained scattered and 
small in scale. Although opponents of -Louis Napoleon mounted 
n 
demonstrations against the coup in Chatillon-sur-Seine, Dijon, 
Beaune, Louhans, St. Gengoux,  con and Cluny, only the area 
around ~ S c o n  produced an armed rebellion. The Nord , similarly, 
had 'begun 1851 with a few conflicts between Republicans and 
defenders of Louis Napoleon, but greeted the coup with no more 
than minor demonstrations in Lille and Douai and a failed attempt 
to raise armed rebellion around Anzin. 
This time, as usual, the action began in paris. But it did 
not end there. Before December, close surveillance and tight 
repression had squeezed the regime's opponents in Paris and 
vicinity. Then came the coup: Louis Napoleon's dissolution and 
occupation of the National Assembly, declaration of a state of 
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siege, and arrest of opposition politicians. Within the city, it 
precipitated a rising of some 1,200 armed Republicans; there were 
barricades, streetfighting, and close to 400 dead. Yet the 
repression had been effective: Louis Napoleon's troops swept up 
the Parisian rebels rapidly, and no one elsewhere in the region 
joined them. The great bulk of 1851's insurgents rose in small 
places within France's southeastern third; of our whole regions, 
only Languedoc contributed large numbers. 
By 1870, Parisian dominance of collective action had 
returned. Neither in 1870 nor in 1871 was Anjou heavily involved 
in the conflicts that shook the country; only a few slateworkers' 
strikes broke the silence. Languedoc, in contrast, had a 
~epublican movement that opposed the Franco-Prussian War, acted 
quickly to support the Republican regime of September 1870, and - .  
leaned' toward the Paris Commune. Toulouse and Narbonne actually 
declared their own Communes in March 1871; neither lasted more 
than a week. 
In Burgundy, Le Creusot likewise produced a small but 
militant Republican movement and briefly formed a Commune. The 
Prussian occupation of Dijon in 1870-71 silenced the Republicans 
of the regional capital, and the rest of the region remained 
relatively inactive. The Nord, too, became a war zone in 1870. 
It involved itself little in the great political struggles of 
those years, concentrating instead on strikes such as the one that 
brought troops to ~oubaix in March 1871. The Ile de France marked 
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out the most important battleground of all, for Paris and 
~ersailles were the prizes. Paris stood out not only for the 
-. 
quick Republican seizure of power that followed the Emperor's 
defeat and capture in September 1870, but also for the Commune of 
1871; in between, the capital shook with struggle among partisans 
of competing futures for France as a whole. 
1905 to 1907 has less of a reputation as a national political 
crisis than do 1830, 1848, 1851, and 1870-71. Yet those years saw 
the definitive .disestablishment of France's state church, the 
arrival of socialists as a national political party, an attempt to 
mount a May Day general strike, a national strike wave coordinated 
by Parisian labor leaders and involving large numbers of 
semi-skilled workers, open confrontation be'tween labor leaders and 
the government, and a vast mobilization of southern winegrowers. 
In Anjou, Republicans and clericals confronted each other 
repeatedly over the closing of convents and the inventory of 
church properties. ~anguedoc was the chief site of the huge 
winegrowers' mobilization of 1907; it proceeded from local 
organization in vintners' towns to meetings bringing hundreds of 
thousands of supporters into Carcassonne, ~fhes, and Montpellier 
to the mass resignation of municipal councils and bloody 
confrontations between troops an'd demonstrators. The old textile 
and wheat areas in the hills and around Toulouse, however, 
remained inactive during the winegrowers' movement and through the 
strike wave that washed industrial France. The Catholic towns of 
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Languedoc ' s northern reaches (present-day ~rd$che and Lozere) , 
however, offered determined resistance to the inventories of 
church property in 1906. 
In Burgundy, winegrowers stayed away from the national 
movement; the most important actions of the period came from 
strikers of ~ontceau-les-Mines, Le Creusot, and a few other 
centers of big industry. The Nord occupied a central position in 
the strike wave of 1906; miners, textile workers, dockers, machine 
builders, and auto workers all ,joined in. But the Nord also saw 
considerable- resistance to the inventories in Boeschape, Halluin, 
~ille, and other towns. The Ile de France greeted 1905-07 with 
numerous .strikes; during the strike wave of 1906, aas in the Nbrd, 
workers in Parisian automobile plants joined a national movement 
for the first time. May Day demonstrations, furthermore, seemed 
to display the revolutionary solidarity of the Parisian working 
class. 
In moving from crisis to crisis, we see the evolution of the 
basic means of collective action. From 1830 to 1907, large 
strikes accompanied major political crises with increasing 
frequency. After 1848, the once-common seizure or blockage of 
food disappeared as a component of major political crises. From 
1848 onward, the deliberately-staged demonstration, complete with 
banners, chants, and marches, became a standard feature of big 
political conflicts. So did the mass. meeting. By 1907, French 
people had clearly created their own version of the social 
movement, combining pre-planned meetings and- demonstrations with 
the creation of special-interest associations, promulgation of 
programs and demands in the names of those associations, claims- of 
support from a mass base, staged confrontations with powerholders, 
and constant struggles for internal control of the movement's 
organizations and strategy. 
Outside of major crises, other changes were occurring. After 
1848, the charivari -- rather an important instrument of local ' 
political struggle in the 1830s and 1840s -- virtually disappeared 
from French politics. So did a number of other venerable forms: 
the invasion of fields or forests, the attack on machines, the* 
destruction of toll gates, and more. The ~rench repertoire of 
contention altered rapidly. 
Broadly speaking, the alteration happened earlier in those 
regions in which capital and coercion concentrated earlier': The 
Ile de France and the Nord moved into the era of large strikes, 
public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, coordinated insur- 
rections, and social movements faster than Burgundy, Languedoc, or 
Anjou. And within the regions, areas of concentration generally 
led the way; although the artisanal winegrowers of Beaune and 
 con remained militant for a long time, such centers as Le 
Creusot and Montceau-les-Mines eventually became Burgundy's prime 
sites of working-class action and innovation. 
The differing patterns of contention in our five regions 
corresponded neatly to variations in the organization of 
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production and coercion. Anjou shows us the politics of a region 
harboring powerful landlords and a mercantile bourgeoisie. 
Flanders reveals the effects of capital concentration and 
proletarianization. Burgundy displays the variation from 
artisanal winegrowing to metalworking and mining. Languedoc 
brings out the contrast among areas of large-scale but stagnant 
agriculture, areas of commercial winegrowing, and areas combining ' 
small-scale farming with small-scale textile production. The Ile 
de France marks the influence of a growing national capital 
surrounded by rings of expanding heavy industry and, farther out, 
of cash-crop agriculture on a grand scale. 
The scope and intensity of workers' organization, for 
example, increased with the extent of capital concentration; in 
that regard, the Nord and the Seine towered. above the other 
departements. On the other hand, government officials- also worked 
harder at surveillance and repression i n  the -Nord and the Seine 
than in most other departements; as a result, workers' 
organizations and dissident political groups that did exist in the 
peripheral regions had a greater chance of surviving periods of 
tightened central control. . 
A Rebellious Century 
The new repertoire moved along. in fits and starts. At the 
scale of a shop or a town, the repeated shocks of reorganization 
in the face of concentrating capital and growing state power 
altered the capacities of ordinary people to act collectively, as 
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well as the relative importance of other parties -- parish 
priests, landlords, local employers, national political figures, 
and others -- to their fates. The local structure of a trade, for 
example, lost much of its strength as a base for collective. 
action, while leaders of national political parties gained 
increasing influence over decisions affecting the welfare of 
people in one trade or another. 
Not only the repertoire, but also the dramatis personae 
shifted. Landlords lost much of their importance as actors. 
Agents of the national government became ever more significant -- 
eventually, for example, figuring in almost every strike as 
observers and policemen, if not as mediators. Parties, labor 
unions and other interest associations appeared openly on the 
scene. Organized capital, organized labor, rivals for control of 
the state, and officials of the state itself emerged as the chief 
participants in large-scale collective action. 
At the scale of a city, a region, or the country as a whole, 
each major political mobilization contributed to changing the 
- character and relative efficacy of different forms of collective 
action. Both the process of mobilization and the strategic 
success or failure of different forms of action left residues 
affecting subsequent mobilizations. 
Many mobilizations filled the time from 1789 to 1914. The 
most obvious were the revolutions: 1789, 1830, 1848, with 1815, 
1870 and 1871 more debatable instances. In each of these cases 
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massive popular mobilization accompanied, and helped cause, .a 
transfer of power over the national state. In addition, a 
staccato of defeated rebellions sounded throughout the period from 
1793 to 1871. If by "rebellion" we mean an occasion on which at 
least a few hundred people seized control of some significant 
public space and held it for more than a day against military 
force, nineteenth-century France had dozens of rebellions. Under 
the July Monarchy alone important rebellions occurred in 1831 
(Lyon), 1832 (Paris), 1834 (Lyon, Paris, St. Etienne), and 1839 
(Paris). 
Later in the nineteenth century, great strikes such as those 
of the Nord in 1880 or of France's mining regions as a whole 
following the ~ourrieres mining disaster of 1906 repeatedly took 
on the guise of rebellion. ~ r o m  the Revolution of 1870 onward, ,, 
organized social movements, with their swirl of meetings, 
demonstrations, pronouncements, and petitions, periodically 
brought hundreds of thousands of French people into public places 
to voice common demands and complaints; the peaking of the great 
movement of southern winegrowers in 1907 brought that sort of 
mobilization to its highest point before World War I. 
None of these events was a monologue. .. Every one of them 
involved dialogue -- often heated -- with powerholders. 1n the 
course of the conversations, three important things happened. 
First, powerholders and their challengers bargained out new 
agreements that constrained them thereafter: agreements about the 
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demands and grievances that had brought people to the streets, 
agreements about the limits and possibilities of future collective 
action. Thus by striking, firm by firm, workers not only reached 
agreements with employers and authorities about the grievances and 
demands they articulated in their strikes, but also acquired the 
right to organize and to strike. The agreements were often 
unsatisfactory. The rights to organize and strike operated within 
stringent limits. Neither qualifidation denies the main point: 
that the agreements produced by dialogue constrained later rounds 
of collective action. 
Second, powerholders altered their strategies of repression 
and facilitation, often by building up their forces for the next 
confrontation, but sometimes by adopting a new means of repression 
or abandoning an old one. Thus as the existence of the' 
demonstration became a fait accompli, governmental authorities 
took to ' issuing permits to assemble or march, laying out 
geographic limits outside of which police or troops had the .right 
to attack demonstrators. 
~hird, challengers shifted their own strategies. Thus as the 
right to public assembly extended (however contingently) from 1848 
on, people moved away from stating their opinions through 
authorized ceremonies such as banquets and funerals, choosing 
instead to hold mass. meetings, marches, demonstrations involving 
explicit statements of their grievances and affiliations. Again, 
the fading of food riots did not mean that shortages and high 
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prices disappeared entirely, or that they disappeared as political 
issues. A Paris which had reverberated with food riots during 
earlier revolutions saw none at all during the starvation of the 
Prussian siege in 1870-71. When widespread vie ch'ere protests 
occurred in the Nord and in Burgundy during 1911, they included 
some price-setting and sacking of merchants' premises, but' 
consisted mainly of orderly boycotts, demonstrations, and marches 
by determined women. People conce.rned about food prices had 
adopted new means of dealing with them. . 
Put together, bargaining. between powerholders and 
challengers, alteration of repression and facilitation, and 
changes in challengers' strategies added up to changes in 
repertoires of contention. The nineteenth-century shift in 
repertoires went even farther than that of the seventeenth 
century. In the seventeenth century, the rebellion linking 
regional powerholders to local populations had virtually 
disappeared, the civilian mutiny had likewise faded away, the 
massive tax rebellion had declined in importance, and the seizure 
or blockage of grain had come into its own. But many forms of 
popular collective action persisted through that seven- 
teenth-century transition: Rough Music, inter-village fights, 
artisans' brawls, invasions of fields, and expulsions of unwanted 
outsiders all remained in the repertoire. 
Practically none of the popular repertoire of contention that 
prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century survived to 
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its end. Invasions of fields, artisans' brawls, inter-village 
fights, even the seizure or blockage of grains virtually 
disappeared. Strikes, public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, 
social movements, and related forms of action took over. 
Consider May Day of 1913 in ~ijon. ~uring the last week of 
April, the building trades union and the ~onfddgration ~gnkrale du 
. Travail post handbills calling for demonstrations for, a reduced 
work week and against the bill proposing three years of military 
'service. Workers affiliated with the Bourse du Travail plan a 
concert, a meeting, and then a demonstration. Confidential 
- A 
reports reaching. the Cote dVOr's central police commissioner, 
however,. say that the workers will not demonstrate unless at least 
five hundred participants show up. Reports from Beaune, 
~h$tillon, Auxonne, and ~&mur assure the prefect that the First of 
May will be calm in those cities and their arrondissements. But 
the prefect of ~a2ne-et-~oire requests - a detachment of gendarmes 
to prevent trouble at Montceau-les-Mines.   is colleague in 
~$te-duOr 'sends 44 men to Montceau. 
Acting on instructions from the Minister of the Interior, the 
~ Z t e  d'0r9s prefect also asks the mayor of Dijon to' forbid any 
demonstration against the Three Year Bill. The police 
commissioner notes the political problem such an instruction gives 
the mayor: If he forbids that demonstration but allows the 
Jeunesses Catholiques to make a march they plan for a few days 
later, he will appear partisan indeed. In any case, the mayor 
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refuses to comply. "The Republican principles of the 
administration I have the honor to direct," he declared, "make it 
a rule to respect the freedom of our fellow citizens, including 
the freedom to move through the streets." He objects to the, , 
application of a double standard, pointing out that: 
~ t -  the time of the festival of Joan of Arc, I authorized the 
supporters of religious schools and their gymnastic 
associations to organize a parade through the city's streets, 
with a concert by their bands at the Place du Peuple. 
1 Furthermore, I have already implicitly authorized the Bourse 
i du ~ravail to organize its street demonstration for May Day, 
as in previous years. . . 
We are informed that the members'of the Bourse du Travail 
plan to demonstrate in favor of certain working conditions, 
likewise in favor of the so-called "~nglish week" and.perhaps 
against the Three Years Bill. 
. . 
The organizers have assured us that everything will go on in 
the customary order; in any case, we have given our police 
the necessary instruc.tions for every eventuality. 
Knowing the temper of our population, we think it would be 
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demonstration of members of the Bourse du Travail on 1 May. 
That to do so could lead to reprisals, especially on the 4th 
of May against the supporters of religious schools, even 
thou.gh they are only supposed to cross the city with their 
bands (ADCO SM 3511). 
As. it turns out, only a hundred-odd workers come to the 1 May 
meeting. The organizers therefore call off the demonstration. 
Yet the background of the non-event shows us a new world and a new 
repertoire: a world of surveillance and tight political 
calculation; a world in which challengers and powerholders bargain 
out not only the exercise of power but also the 1imit:s within 
which demonstrations occur; a world where specialized associations 
do a great deal of public business; a world in which orderly shows 
of strength make a political difference. All things considered, 
in Dijon of 1913 we see the world of collective action we know 
today. 
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